Introduction
Inductive learning is an important subject in Artificial Intelligence research, because it has many practical applications, and because it can be sufficiently formalised. Examples of such formalisations are [Mitchell 1982] and [Laird 1988] . When devising a formal model of inductive learning, it is important to keep the model as general as possible, thereby indicating how more specific models can be obtained from the general model by making specific choices for, e.g., the structure of the hypothesis space involved.
Within [he field of discrete mathematics, the theory of lattices provides a particularly good example of such a general model.
It is in a general model for inductive learning that we are interested. However, it is difficult to build such an abstract model from scratch. To avoid this difCiculty, many existing models are based on specific learning situations. For instance, Mitchell introduces his Version Spaces by referring to the problem of concept learning from examples, where an example is taken to be a member from the class described by the concept. The drawback of such an intuitively appealing model is, that some basic assumptions are left implicit. To make these assumptions explicit, we have been looking for learníng situations for which Version Spaces are not adequate. One such learning situation is described in this paper.
This learning situation, which we call the Schema Inference Problem, will be our guideline throughout the paper. We will attempt to give learning algorithms for that problem, and in doing so we will describe a learning paradigm called second-order inductive learning in which the problem fits. This learning paradigm differs from existing models in various respects. While this is our main objective, we also point at fundamental implicit assumptions underlying the Version Space model when we encounter them. Such assumptions concern properties of a model for inductive learning, and are therefore`metatheoretical' notions. In this respect, our efforts can be interpreted as being directed`towards a meta-theory of inducuve leaming' [Flach 1990a ]. 
The Schema Inference Problem

The problem
The research reported here originates from the following problem: given the (partial) contents of a knowledge base, derive (parts of) the conceptual model of that knowledge base. This is clearly an inductive problem, and it will be studied here from the viewpoint of inductive le~tming. Aspects of this problem, restricted to finding functional and multivalued dependencies for a relational database, will be discussed in a forthcoming report [Flach 1990b ]. Here, we study the problem of inducing type hierarchies from type assignments to individuals, which we call the Schema Inference Problem. The signiCicance of this problem from the standpoint of conceptual modeling is illustrated by, e.g., [Vermeir 8r. Nijssen 1982] .
The use of inductive methods for these problems has, to the best of our knowledge, not been proposed before. 
A-~B.
A schema E over a type set 6 is a set of schema sentences containing only type symbols from a; a is called the domain of E. For convenience, we adopt a graphical representation of schemas as follows: each type symbol in a is represented by a distinct circle with the type symbol written inside, and for every schema sentence A-~B in the schema there is a directed arrow from the circle representing A to the circle representing B.
E.g., the schema {B-~C) over (A,B,C) is represcnted asl
(semantics) A type population is a set of constant symbols. A schema population for a schema E with domain a is a function iI mapping type symbols in a to type populations such that for each two type symbols A and B in 6, A-~~implies iI(A)~li(B); -~E is defined to be the transitive closure of -~(interpre[ed as a relation between type symbols, defined by the schema E).
(examples) A positive example is a statement of the form A(a); a negative ezample is a statement of the form -,B(c).
(consistency) A schema is consistent with a set of positive and negative examples, iff there is a schema population II such that:
for each positive example A(a), aE II(A);
for each negative example -,B(c), c~II(B).
1Note, that this is according to the definitions: a schema need not contain all type symbols in its domain. In the conesponding diagram, the type symbols that are not contained in the schema are represented by circles not connected by arrows to any other circle.
(learning) The problem is, to find a learning algorithm that, given a domain a for a schema, takes one example at a time, and after each example outputs a schema over 6 that is consistent with the examples seen so far.Ĩ II(B)-(b,c}, II(X)-(b) . Put differently, by introducing an auxiliary type X, we can express that types A and B have something in common. S[ill, we want to say that the domain of the resulting schema is {A,B}. Therefore, we extend the definition of a schema as follows: a schema E over a type set 6 is a set of schema sentences; the type symbols occurring in E but not in t5 denote auxiliary types, and each auxiliary type symbol should occur on the left hand side of at least two schema sentences in E. Thc definition of a schema population is left unchanged, that is, the domain of II is the type set a. Populations for auxiliary types X can then be derived by taking the intersection of all types A for which tlte schema contains a sentence X-~A (thus, X is taken to be the largest common subtype possible). To make this a little bit more precise, we define the notion of generality.
A proposed solution
The generality ordering
The usual notion of generality is extensional, i.e. based on extensions (sets of instances) of expressions. In the case of schemas, instances are schema populations. So we define: given a type set 6, a schema E1 over a is at least as general as a schema E2 over a, notation E1?E2, iff each schema populationq for E2 is also a schema population for E1. Alternatively, we say that E2 is at least as specific as E1, and write E2~E1. Obviously, this relation is reflexive and transitive; strictly speaking, it is not anti-symmetric: there are several schemas for schema populations that contain at least three identical type populations. Because this is a bit unlikely to occur in practice, we will treat ? as a parUal ordering5. If EI?E2 but E1~E2, we write El~E2 (E2~E1) and say that E1 is more general than E2 (E2 is more specific than EI).
3This will be done in section 4.1. qFor technical reasons, this definition of generality assumes schema populations consisting of non-empty type populations. This assumption will be madc throughout the paper.
STechnically speaking, this amounts to assuming that there exists a normal form such that every equivalence class of the quasi ordering 5 contains exactly one member in normal form.
There are five distinct schemas over {A,B), and their generality ordering can be depicted as in fig. According to the above definitions, the population II defined by II(A)-{a,b}, II(B)-{b} is a population for the empty schema Q) over {A,B). However, intuitively we would expect that type populations for this schema would be disjoint, as the schema states that the two types have nothing in common. Conversely, given the schema population II, we would intuitively say that it is typically a population for the schema (B-~A ). We can capture this intuition by deiining a typical (schema) population IIE for a schema E to be any schema population that is not a population for a more specific schema. That is, IIE contains not more information than E conveys: adding information to E(making it more specific) causes IIE to be no longer a population for it. If IIE is a typical population for E, [hen we call E an intended schema for IIE.
The naive leatning algorithm above is precisely based on typical populations and intended schemas.
The set of positive examples is interpreted as a typical population, for which an intended schema is construed. Notice, that any population has exactly one intended schema, a property about which we will have more to say later. The reason that the naive learning algorithm is somewhat unsatisfactory with respect to convergence, is that type populations in typical schema populations do not monotonically get 6 larger when the intended schema gets more general. For instance, let II1(A)-II2(A)-(a,b} and -(a,b,c) , thus II2(B)~Iïl(B); yet, the intended schema for iil is E1-(X-~A, X--~B), while the intended schema for TI2 is E2-{A-~B), hence E2~E1. We will return to this issuc as well.
The main conclusion must be, that what seems a reasonable and cautious approach at first sight, namely, to take only the positive and certain knowledge, and to translate it into a hypothesis by interpreting it as constituting a typical population, does not yield minimal hypotheses. On the other hand, in concept learning from examples it is exactly this approach of taking the disjunction of the positive examples, that dces result in minimal hypotheses. Therefore, we proceed by studying in some detail the basic assumptions underlying the use of a partially ordered hypothesis space in concept learning. One of the most general accounts thereof is the Version Space model [Mitchell 1982] . After that, we analyse the differences between this model and our Schema Inference Problem, in order to come up with a model of second-order inductive leaming.
Version Spaces
Outline of the Version Space model
Originally, the Version Space model (or VS model) was formulated as follows. Let there be given a set I of instances i, and a language LG for expressing generalisations G. Generalisations describe sets of instances, and a generalisation G matches an instance i if i is a member of the set described by G, or more succinct, if i is an instance of G. Matching is described by a matching predicate M(G, t), which is we iff i is an instance of G. Mitchell defines G1 to be more specific thanó G2 iff {iEl I M(G1, i)}~{iEl I M(G2, i)}. That is, G1 is more specific than G2 (and, equivalently, G2 is more general than G1) iff the set of instances of G1 is a subset of the set of instances of G2.
Positive examples are instances of the generalisation to be learned, and negative examples are noninstances. Conversely, a generalisation is consistent with the examples iff it matches every positive example and no negative example. In determining the set of consistent generalisations, the generality ordering can be utilised as follows. If a generalisation C matches a positive example p, then every generalisation more general than G will also match p. Assuming that there are no infinite descending chains of generalisations, this implies that there exist minimal generalisations Gp consistent with p (i.e., a generalisation is consistent with p if and only if it is at least as general as some Gp). Similarly, under the assumption that every ascending chain of generalisations is finite, one can associate with each negative example n maximal generalisations Gn such that only and all generalisations at least as specific as some Gn are consistent with n.
From these considerations it follows that the set of generalisations consistent with every example, the Version Space, is bounded from below by a set S of most specific generalisations, derived from the positive examples, and bounded from above by a set G of most general generalisations, derived from the negative examples, such that a generalisation is consistent with the examples ifC it is between S and G.
This means, that the Version Space need not be stored explicitly: if the partial ordering is recursively enumerable, storage of S and G suffices. We further note that an efficient implementation of the VS model is possible, if there is an algorithm for computing new elements of S(G) out of Gp (Gn) and a new example e, when Gp (Gn) tutns out to be inconsistent with e (without a mere search of the partial ordering).
Generalising the Version Space model
The Version Space model is a signif'icant step towards a general theory of inductive learning. Many existing methods can be cast into the general framework of Version Spaces. However, the model presented above uses some rather specific notions, that are not essential for the model of Version Spaces. Also, there are some small technical shortcomings in Mitchell's formulation of the model. There is some confusion in the notion of partial order he uses: in fact, the generality ordering as defined above is a quasi-ordering, because several syntactically distinct generalisations may have the same set of instances. This raises a more general point: Mitchell fails to make a distinction between syntax and semantics. Indeed, what is presented to the learner are not instances, but descriptions of instances.
Thus, Mitchell assumes that any instance can be uniquely described within the instance language, which 6In fact, the relation should be called at least as specific as, as has been pointed out before. However, here we follow Mitchell's account.
is not true in general. For a worked-out model which distinguishes between syntax and semantics, see (Laird 1988] .
A more serious restriction of the VS model, as well as an opportunity to make the model more general, is indicated by Mitchell when he writes: "Notice the above deCinition of the [more-specific-than] relation is extensional-based upon the instance sets that the generalisations rcpresent. In order for the more-specfic-than relation to be practically computable by a computer program, it must be possible to determine whether G 1 is more-specific-than G2, without computing the (possibly infinite) sets of instances that they match." [Mitchell 1982, p.206] . In other words, there should be a syntactical ordering 5 on generalisations, definable without reference to instances, with the property that G15G2 iff
But then we could forget about instance sets altogether, and relate the matching predicate to the syntactical generality ordering as follows:
This equivalence boils down to the following two implications:
Formula (la) expresses what is called completeness of the matching predicate (or consistency predicate) in [Flach 1989 ]: it enables us to say that any generalisation between the boundaries S and G is indeed consistent. Formula (lb) requires, for any two generalisations G1 and G2 such that not G1~G2, the existence of a witness i that is matched by G1 and not matched by G2. In words: the matching predicate should not be too coarse for the paztial ordering at hand. This implication can be rephrased into a formula describing the relation between syntax and semantics (see [Laird 1988] ).
Formula (la) can be generalised in several ways. First, notice that it can also be written as di:~M(G2,i)~G15G2~-,M(Gl,t~( 3.1á)
stating that if G2 dces not match i, anything below it won't either. Although formulas ( la) and ( la') are logically equivalent, we could say that (la) describes the existence of the lower boundary S, and (la') describes the existence of the upper boundary G. To make this more apparent, the formulas can be written in the following form:
where MS denotes the original matching predicate M, and MG is defined as the negation of MS~. Now, it has been shown in (Flach 1989] Let us make the nature of second-order inductive leaming more precise. In doing so, we will depart slightly from Mitchell's terminology by preferring the term`hypothesis' over`generalisation'. Let there be given a set H of (second-order) For judging the correctness of a learning algorithm, i.e. its capability to infer the correct hypothesis eventually, consistency is not enough. As an example, in first-order learning the strategy to take a most general consistent hypothesis is incorrect when only positive examples are available, because in that case it will stick to the most general hypothesis forever, and thus will fai! to come up with the conect hypothesis (unless it is the most general one). On the other hand, a strategy to take a most specific consistent hypothesis is correct in this case, provided that such a hypothesis is unique once enough examples aze available. Several models for correctness of inductive algorithms have been proposed. One of the best-known models is identification in the limit [Gold 1967 , Angluin 8c Smith 1983 ]. An inductive algorithm identifies the correct hypothesis in the limit, iff it makes the cotrect guess after a finite amount of time, and never changes its guess afterwards. To this end, the algorithm is supplied with a sufficienr presentation, i.e. a sequence of examples such that every instance occurs at least once. The algorithm is not required to signal its final guess (if it dces, it finitely identifies the correct hypothesis); hence, for all practical applications restrictions are applied to the global convergence of the sequence of hypotheses. A common restriction is consistency, i.e. any hypothesis should be consistent with the examples seen so faz. This restriction leads to algorithms of which the intermediate hypotheses make sense. Another common restriction is, that the algorithm be conservative, that is, it outputs a hypothesis different from its previous guess only when the previous guess is inconsistent with the ezamples seen so far.
How do these criteria apply to the naive learning algorithm (henceforth referred to as the NLA) for the Schema Inference Problem? The first question is, whether the algorithm is correct. Let Ep be the correct schema. In order to give examples for this schema, the teacher selects a population IIp for F,p. If the teacher supplies a sufficient presentation, eventually every pair (A,a), where aE IIp(A), will have been presented as an example A(a). But then the NLA has identified IIp, because it constructs the minimal gFor brevity, if the set of examples E is understood we talk about consistent populations and hypotheses.
population from the examples. For this population, the NLA constructs the intended schema. This schema will only be equal to F{l, if IIp is a typical population for Fp. Hence, we can draw the conclusion that the NLA is correct iff the teacher selects examples according to a typical population for the conect hypothesis. This constraint seems fairly reasonable.
The NLA is also consistent: at any stage, the current hypothesis E has a population (namely, its typical population IIE) such that for every example A(a), aE IIE(A). However, the algorithm is not conservative, as can easily be concluded from the illustration given in section 2.2, where the hypothesis (B~A} is first adopted, then abandoned, only to be adopted again later. Because the hypothesis is adopted a second time and the algorithm is consistent, there is a population corresponding to all the examples given until then; but then the hypothesis is also consistent with any subset of the examples given, and it follows that there was no need to abandon it in the f"ust place. Because the NLA is not conservative, it dces not exhibit a`smooth' convergence towards the correct schema.
Second-order learning of hypotheses by first-order learning of prototypes
As may have become apparent in the previous section, the naive learning algorithm presented in section 2.2 embodies a particular implementation technique for second-order inductive leaming. As has been shown, the algorithm contains a correct (as well as consistent and conservative) procedure for firstorder learning of populations. In a second stage, the inferred population is mapped to a uniquely determined (because intended) schema. Obviously, this mapping is only justified if the original population is a typical population for the correct schema. The underlying assumptions can be generalised as follows. he idea of the Prototype Assumption is, that if the teacher uses a prototype for selecting examples, the learner can learn by first-order identification of the prototype from the examples, followed by the detennination of the intended hypothesis for that prototype. First-order identifiability (of populations) refers to the existence of inethods for identification in the limit of any population from positive and negative examples (involving instances). Similarly, second-order identifiabiliry (of hypotheses) refers to the existence of inethods for identification in the limit of any hypothesis from positive and negative examples (involving instances). We thus arrive at the following proposition.
PROPOSTI'ION 1. Under the Protorype Assumption, f rst-order identifiability of protorypes
implies second-order identifzabiliry of intended hypotheses.Ĩ nterestingly, under the Prototype Assumption it is possible to identify a hypothesis in the limit without being able to identify a single prototype in the limit. Define the relation -: P-P' iff any two prototypes P and P' have the same intended hypothesis. Clearly, this relation is an equivalence relation, and each of its equivalence set contains all prototypes for a specific hypothesis. Suppose it is possible to identify some hypothesis Hp from examples, then it may still be the case that no first-order inductive algorithm is able to distinguish some elements of the set of prototypes for Hp. 
Proof. The following has to be proven: if Hmin is a minimal consistent hypothesis and
Hmax is a maximal consistent hypothesis and HminSH~Flmax. then H is a consistent hypothesis. Assuming the existence of minimal and maximal consistent hypotheses, this is logically equivalent with A1 is consistent n HZ is consistent n H15H5l-12~H is consistent
According to the definitions, a hypothesis H is consistent iff there is a population P for H that is consistent. But then P is also a population for any H2fí, hence any H2F1 is also consistent:
H1 is consistent n H1~H~H is consistent
Obviously this latter fotmula implies the former.T he latter formula also implies that the VSg is only bounded from above by the most general hypotheses, and that this upper boundary is fixed. This means, that convergence has to be provided by the lower boundary moving upwards alone. In other words, second-order inductive learning trivially satisfies the separability condition: in practice, we only work with the lower boundary.
Why are boundaries of a Version Space useful? The appropriate answer, of course, is that thase boundaries move toward each other as leaming proceeds, excluding more and more hypotheses. Indeed, would this be not true for a particular learning problem, then we would have severe doubts concerning the well-definedness of the problem. We therefore define a problem of inductive learning to be sound iff any hypothesis that becomes inconsistent after a number of examples, remains inconsistent when new examples are added. The following result shows that second-order inductive learning is sound. In stating this Theorem, we use the notions of positive instance set PE-(pEly I~p,t~is a positive example) and negative instance set NE-{nEly I~n;~is a negative example).
THEOREM 4(Soundness of second-order inductive learning). Any hypothesis that is
inconsistent with positive instance set PE or negative instance set NE, will also be inconsistent with any farger positive instance set PE'~PE resp. any largernegative instance set NE'.~NE.
Proof. H is inconsistent iff for every population P for H, PE~P v P~(IgNE), which implies for any PE'~PE and any NE'~NE, PE'~P v P~(I~NE~for every population P
for H.F inally, we investigate the condition under which a hypothesis Hmin is a minimal consistent hypothesis. Let Pmin~a population for Hmin, and let H be a hypothesis below Hmin. then any population P for H should be inconsistent:
PE~Pmin~(Ilf NE) n H~Flmin~PE~P v P~(IH--NE) (4.1)
Until more is known about the relation between populations and hypotheses, nothing more can be said. 
Second-order inductive learning for the Schema Inference Problem
In this section, we will develop a leaming algorithm for the Schema Infcrence Problem, based on lhe GVS approach. This learning algorithm will be conservative, as opposed to the naive learning algorilhm given in section 2.2, and thus converge more smoothly to the final solution. As suggested in the previous section, we have to establish the relation between populations and schemas, in order to construct a minimal consistent schema. Recall that a schema is consistent if it has a population containing every positive example and no negative example. It follows thaat a minimal consistent schema must have a typical population containing every positive ezample and no negative example (otherwise, there would be a more specific schema for this population, which would also be consistent).
In the naive learning algorithm, we tried to find this minimal consistent schema by conswcting a smallest population agreeing with the examples (i.e., the positive instancc sct PE9). Howevcr, this rests upon the assumption that smaller populations have more speciCic intended schemas, which is not true in Withouth loss of generality, we may assume that E is over {A,B )(see fig. 2 ). We can distingtrish the following cases: -~A,X--~B) . Notice that this is indeed a minimal consistent schema, as opposed to fd, which we would have obtained had we not included A(x) and B(x) in our prototype. Notice also, that there is obviously no way of arriving at (d as a minimal consistent schema, if the number of constant symbols is uncountable.
Note carefully, that we have not yet made any assumption about whether the teacher chooses his examples from a typical population or just from any population for the tazget schema. The fact that the most specific consistent schemas are consistent by virtue of prototypes is just a consequence of the model itself. Therefore, the assumption that the teacher chooses his examples according to a typical population dces not make any difference for the lower boundary. It does, however, make some difference for the upper boundary: once it has been established that in a prototype two types have a common member, a maximal consistent hypothesis should at least state that these two types have a common subtype.
However, this is a hypotheses that can never be falsified, ands so it will remain the maximal consistent hypothesis forever. Convergence has not improved much.
Let us state the convergence properties for second-order learning for the Schema Inference Problem more clearly. In general, the VSg will not collapse to a unique solution, because in many cases the boundaries never meet. So we have two learning strategies: stick to the lower boundary, and stick to the upper boundary. If we stick to the lower boundary, the resulting algorithm performs identification in the limit provided the teacher selects examples according to a pmtotype, and provided the correct schema is connected. Moreover, the resulting algorithm is consistent and conservative, thus providing`smoother' convergence than the NLA. If we stick to the upper boundazy, the resulting algorithm performs identification in the limit provided the teacher selects examples according to a prototype, and provided the types in the correct schema are either unconnected or only connected via common subtypes (two rather uninteresting cases).
Finally, we illustrate the second-order inductive learning algorithm for the Schema Inference Problem roughly sketched in this section. Let the type set be (A,B}. In fig. 4 below, each line specifies the example given, the maximal consistent hypothesis after that example, the minimal consistent hypothesis after that example, and the prototype used to construe that minimal consistent hypothesis. 
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Second-order learning and logic
Until now, we have contrasted second-order inductive learning with the standard framework of Version Spaces, and we have concluded that there are many differences. This is an important result, because it allows us to incorporate the Version Space model in a more general`meta-model'. On the other hand, a fonnulation of the Schema Inference Problem in first-order logic~t dces not seem (at first sight) to cause problems. An example is a ground literal like p( a)(positive example) or~q ( b) (negative example); a schema consists of formulas of the form p( x) :-q ( x), and a schema S is consistent with a set of examples E iff S,E [~0. In this section, we briefly investigate whether exisáng methods for induction in first-order logic are applicable to the Schema Inference Problem.
A general framework for inductively inferring logical theories from facts was provided by [Shapiro 1981 ]. In this framework, the induction algorithm starts with the most general theory !] (which implies everything), and a new example is read. If the current theory is too strong (implies too much), then the guilty clause is diagnosed and removed from the theory. If the cutrent theory is too weak, then a new clause has to be added to the theory; candidates are socalled refinements of previously removed clauses. In order to guarantee identification in the limit of the theory, the refinement operator must be complete. A complete refinement operator for the Schema Inference PYoblem is shown in fig. 4 . Figure 4 . A complete refinement operator for the Schema Inference Problem.
Despite appearances, there is a problem here: the clauses below the dashed line in fig. 4 will never be induced, because the refinements that yield a smaller increase in the size of the current theory are tried first. In other words, the induction algorithm will do nothing more than collecting the examples. The reason, of course, is the definition of consistency: in Shapiro's framework, a theory is consistent with a set of facts if it implies these facts, while in our framework, we use the weaker propeny of logical consistency.
An alternative, but equally general (although somewhat less elaborated fortnally) framework for induction of logical theories is presented in [Muggleton 8r. Buntine 1988] . In this framework, induction is carried out by inverting resolution. A number of inverse resolution operators is defined, including the V-operaror, which induces q( x):-p ( x) from p( a) and q( a), and the W-operator, which induces p(x) :-x(x),x(a),andp(x) :-x(x) fromp(a) andq(a) (fig.5 ). 
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have presented a new paradigm for inductive learning. The usefulness of this paradigm was suggested by the Schema Inference Problem, which we used to define the paradigm. We have sketched methods for devising leaming algorithms for second-order inductive learning, one based on traditional first order leaming, and a new method specifically for second-order leaming.
In the course of the paper, we have pointed at several possibilities for generalising the Version Space model. One of these generalisations we called Generalised Version Spaces or VSg's, in which upper and lower boundaries may differ from the Version Space boundaries. We have also identified thc separability condition, which allows consistency to be separated into upper and lower consistency, and the soundness property of inductive learning. Another important notion is compositionality, which allows for incremental learning algorithms. We have shown, that compositionality dces not hold (in general) in second-order inductive learning. In our ongoing research [Flach 1990a ], we aze merging these notions into a general model.
We have shown, that second-order inductive leazning not only differs from the Version Space model, but also from the framework of induction of logical theories from facts, with respect to the consistency criterion used. Consequently, Shapiro's methods aze not applicable (at least not without modification), while Muggleton and Buntine's inverse resolution operators are, by deriving a new control regime under which they should be appGed.
A final observation: an alternative account of second-order inductive learning can be given, if a population is viewed as an example, that is only incompletely specified by the instances. In [Flach 1989] we azgued that concept learners should allow for incomplete examples, because they still provide some information, albeit less than a completely specified example. From this perspective, second-order inductive leaming as defined here could be called concept learning from one incomplete example. This account of second-order inductive learning possibly makes an integration of first-order and second-order leaming into a general theory of inductive leaming more feasible.
